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ABSTRACT 
In  this  study,  I  examine  the  effects  of  corruption  on  patterns  of  relations  in a  w e l l -known  case  of 
organizational crime. By contrasting corrupt and non-corrupt projects within an organization, I am able to 
examine how fraudulent endeavors alter the way individuals mobilize to accomplish a goal. This study 
examines longitudinal data and couples qualitative coding techniques with social network analysis to 
understand  the  effects  of  corruption  on  social  structure.  In  contrast  to  non-corrupt  projects,  corrupt 
networks have lower connectivity, fewer reciprocal relations, and communicate less frequently. These 
different  patterns  also  hold  for  between- a n d  w i t h i n -subject  studies.  For  individuals,  corrupt 
communications, a s  c o m p a r e d  t o  n o n -corrupt  communications, a r e  l e s s  f r e q u e n t ,  less  likely  to  be 
reciprocated, and have reduced transitivity, meaning that message recipients are not as likely to share a 
communication link. This study highlights the role of content in understanding the emergent properties of 
communication networks. 
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Between 2000-2011, the U.S. saw an unprecedented rise in organizational crime, particularly in the form 
of f r a u d u l e n t  a c c o u n t i n g  practices b y  Fortune  500  firms.  Organizational  crime  is  a  crime  wherein 
members  of  an  organization  commit  the  illegal  action p r i m a r i l y  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
(Clinard and Yeagar, 1980). Enron typified such forms of organizational crime and corporate deception as 
one of the first of the U.S.’s major corporations to come under investigation for accounting fraud. In 
2001, Enron publicly admitted to overstating its earnings by $586 million and hiding $3 billion in debt 
(McLean and Elkind, 2003). Not long thereafter, it was found that WorldCom, the second largest phone 
company in the United States, misreported profits by $3.8 billion by improperly shifting certain expenses 
to capital funds (Patsuris, 2002). Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) levied a $550 million penalty against Goldman Sachs Group, the largest ever against 
a Wall Street firm, for misleading investors in collateralized debt obligations (Hurtado and Harper, 2010). 
Recently in 2011, a court-appointed examiner’s report determined that Lehman Brothers had reshuffled 
$50 billion off the firm’s balance sheet to help the investment bank appear less financially troubled than it 
was before its collapse in 2008 (Merced and Werdigier, 2011). Though these cases of accounting fraud 
abound, organizational scholars know relatively little about the implementation of organizational crime. 
At each of these large corporations, managers employed complex accounting methods to mislead 
investors about the financial health of their firms. However, these financial misdeeds were not localized 
to a few executives in the firm; they required the involvement of many organizational members from 
various departments in order to implement such accounting malfeasance. The looming question from 
these incidents is how these managers were able to organize and carry out criminal activity that required 
participation from multiple members. In this way, organizational crime in the form of accounting fraud 
mirrors  the  regular  activities  of  a  for-profit  firm,  which  largely  entail  coordinating  organizational 
members to successfully implement projects in order to maximize the profit for the company – except that 
in the case of organizational crime the means used to meet the objectives are, of course, illegal. This leads 
to second question: are the structures in organizations used to implement legitimate projects the same as The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   4       
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those that are meant to deceive monitoring agencies and investors? This study examines the case of 
organizational crime at Enron to understand how such fraudulent activity is organized. As one the first 
Fortune 500 firms to commit such large scale accounting fraud, Enron provides an excellent setting to 
understand how corruption takes form.  
To address these questions, I utilize an important and unique dataset for understanding the social 
structure of deviance. Using email communication from Enron, I couple qualitative coding of message 
contents  with  social  network  analysis  to  permit  a  finer  examination  of  organizational  relations  and 
behavior. These data provide an excellent opportunity to gather behavioral measures on corruption, which 
have been historically difficult to obtain. Email messages also have a qualitative richness not normally 
found in network analysis. Additionally, by examining networks at both the group level and the individual 
level, I am able to speak to the micro-macro linkages often lacking in network research (Ibarra, Kilduff, 
and Tsai, 2005).  
Rather than investigate the antecedents of corruption, I examine how illegal endeavors come to be 
organized. I treat the decision to participate in fraud as exogenous in this study. Instead, I focus on 
network  forms  that  emerge  when  members  cooperate  to  implement  an  organizational  crime.  By 
identifying non-corrupt and corrupt projects at Enron, I am able to compare the networks of complex 
projects. This study design also permits me to examine the behavior of individuals that lead to different 
structures. I show that micro-level communication behaviors concerning the criminal activity create a 
characteristically different network form – a hub-and-spoke structure with concentric rings of information 
access.  
CORRUPT NETWORK TRADE-OFFS 
Research in sociology suggests that when certain types of content are deemed illegitimate or 
counter-normative, individuals alter their communication behavior. For example, in Lee's (1969) The 
Search for an Abortionist, which was set at a time when abortions were illegal and neither the doctors 
who performed abortions nor the women who sought them could do so openly, individuals were careful 
and strategic with whom they could discuss the procedure. In their seminal work on collusion networks, The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   5       
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Baker and Faulkner (1993) found that individuals involved in illegal networks appeared to arrange their 
communications in order to evade detection. Thus, the motivations of individuals in communications can 
have cumulative effects on the emergent social system. 
As  Goffman  (1970)  originally  noted,  the  constraint  of  secrecy  distinguishes  illegal 
communication networks from legitimate communication networks. In his view, corrupt networks have 
the additional challenge of remaining secret while simultaneously ensuring the necessary coordination 
and control of their members. This trade-off hinges on information access for the network members. 
Members  require  some  level  of  information  to  efficiently  and  effectively  organize,  but  limiting 
information  throughout  the  network  helps  shield  members  from  possible  detection  and  maintains 
concealment.  The  puzzle  for  corrupt  networks  is  that  the  behavior  that  coincides  with  effective 
coordination – frequent communications, reciprocity, and cohesion – makes the group more vulnerable to 
detection. And generally, non-corrupt projects do not face this trade-off. 
1 
FREQUENCY OF COMMUNICATON 
In the instance of novel and complex endeavors, frequency of communication assists individuals 
in clarifying issues, resolving problems, and expediting the project’s goals (Eisenhardt, 1989). Frequency 
is not simply the volume of communication but it also indicates greater information sharing between two 
members. Frequency of interaction is a commonly used measure of relational strength, with increased 
communications leading to increased tie-strength (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Close interpersonal links 
facilitate  knowledge  transfer  and  are m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  c o i n c i d e  w i t h  a  g r eater  motivation  to  assist 
(Granovetter, 1985; Reagans and McEvily, 2003). Hence, for projects where the task is complex and its 
outcome  uncertain,  frequent  communication  amongst  the  project  team m e m b e r s   serves t o  improve 
information access and group coordination.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
! This is not to suggest that the non-corrupt groups arrive at the optimal network form. Rather that they 
are unencumbered by secrecy, and the assumption here is that criminal activity requires covert 
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In the case of corrupt networks, each time members share information about the illicit endeavor, 
they run the risk of being discovered. The corrupt group must strike a balance between coordinating 
members t o  c o m p l e t e  i t s  g o a l s  a n d  shielding  its  members f r o m  d e t e c t i o n .  Members m a y  a t t e m p t  t o  
minimize risk by decreasing communication to the lowest amount possible without jeopardizing the goals 
of  the  project  (Goffman, 1 9 7 0 ;  p 7 8 ) .   Since  it  behooves  the  individual  and t h e  g r o u p  t o  r e s e r ve 
communication to only the most essential sharing of information, the effects of corruption on frequency 
should be found at both the network and the individual. Formally,  
Hypothesis 1a: Corrupt information networks will have lower communication frequency than 
non-corrupt information networks. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Sharing corrupt information reduce communication frequency for the individual. 
 
RECIPROCAL COMMUNICATION 
Norms  of  reciprocity  are  commonly  found  among g r o u p s a c r o s s  various  settings ( G o u l d n e r ,  
1960). In addition to its prevalence in groups, reciprocity is also critical for coordinating projects and 
developing effective channels of communication. A network rich with reciprocal communications permits 
discourse between the members to help them clarify, extend, and refine ideas. Reciprocity also reduces 
uncertainty between individuals by promoting trust and solidarity (Molm, Schaefer, and Collett, 2007). 
Additionally,  the  act  of  reciprocating i t s e l f  e n g e n d e r s  c o m m i t m e n t  a n d  p o s i t i v e  a f f e c t  among  group 
members, which benefits group coordination (Molm, 1990, 1997). Given the norm of reciprocity and its 
benefits  to  group  coordination,  I  propose  that  complex  project  networks  will b e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  
reciprocal communication. 
On  the  other  hand, r eciprocity  can  also  be  less  efficient  and  increase t h e  r i s k  o f  d e t e c t i o n .  
Structures that contain a high number of nonreciprocal or asymmetrical relations tend to be more efficient 
for  information  transmission w i t h  f e w e r  r e d u n d a n t  c h a n n e l s  t o  d e t e c t  ( G u e tzkow  and  Simon,  1955). 
Greater reciprocity necessitates greater amounts of interaction, since the receiver must respond to the 
sender. This, in turn, creates more opportunities for the group and its members to be discovered. Systems 
with  low  levels  of  reciprocity  also  inherently  lead  to  differences  in  information  acquisition, w i t h  The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   7       
  7!
information commonly flowing to the most powerful or highest status members (Brass, Butterfield, and 
Skaggs, 1998). In an asymmetrical communication network, receiving information from well informed 
others contributes more to the individual’s knowledge (Bonacich, 2001). And this pattern can serve to 
aggregate  information  toward  certain  actors  making  them  structurally  central.  Thus, a s y m m e t r i c a l  o r  
hierarchical  structures  heighten  control  over  information  particularly  for  central  members ( B o n a c i c h ,  
1987; Freeman, 1979)."!Finally, there is evidence to suggest that illegal activities tend to yield centralized, 
hierarchical networks (Baker & Faulkner 1993; Simmel 1950). Hence,  
Hypothesis 2a: Corrupt information networks will have more asymmetrical relations than non-
corrupt information networks. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Sharing corrupt information will increase asymmetrical relations for the 
individual. 
 
GROUP COHESION  
Group cohesion generally refers to the extent to which group members are inter-connected with 
each other. Cohesion is important for project groups particularly because a connected structure allows 
members to consult and gain complex information from one another through established ties and relations 
(Hansen, 1999; Uzzi, 1999). A well-connected, cohesive group permits more individuals to be uniformly 
and adequately informed because in such projects, members are more likely to share similar information 
(Burt, 1987). Information also diffuses more rapidly in these groups (Coleman, 1988).  
Despite the advantages of group cohesion, the secrecy required in corrupt networks may hinder 
connectivity within the network. Corrupt project participants may seek to create graduated divisions of 
labor that serve as organizational buffers, sealing off members from on another (Simmel, 1950; Goffman, 
1970).  Consequently,  these  cleavages  in  the  network  render  it  difficult  to  implicate  the  entire  group 
(Granovetter,  2007).  Lastly,  sparse  networks  permit  more  opportunities  for  malfeasance  and 
organizational deviance because of the group’s inability to effectively monitor all of its members (Burt, 
2004; Mitchell, 2003; Vaughan, 1999). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Therefore, I do not assume that all members had complete knowledge of the illicit undertaking but were 
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Transitivity refers to the tendency of two individuals, who both share a connection to a common 
third person, to also become tied to each other (Davis, 1963; Feld, 1981; Holland and Leinhardt, 1971). 
When  actors  promote  connections  between  their  alters,  the  level  of  cohesion  surrounding  them  is 
increased. This localized cohesion is generally optimal for sharing information, encouraging cooperation, 
and reducing conflict (Simmel, 1950). In addition, dyadic relations embedded within closed triads are 
more stable and more likely to produce consensus (Krackhardt, 1999). In cases where the task is complex, 
such as those investigated here, even the redundancy of information that high cohesion promotes can 
benefit the project and its participants (Obstfeld, 2005).  
However,  when  the  objectives o f  t h e  g r o u p  i n c l u d e  s e c r e c y ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  m a y  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  
obstruct or limit relations between alters. By discouraging ties between alters, actors enhance their local 
control and power over the separated others (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This parallels 
Simmel’s (1950) concept of Divide et Impera, “divide and conquer”, where the third actor strategically 
keeps two actors separate to maintain some degree of power over them (p162). Open triads also reduce 
the possibility that alters are aware of each other’s involvement or the network in its entirety. The absence 
of  connections  that  characterizes  open  triads  also  leads t o  a  n e t w o r k  r i c h  w i t h  structural  holes  or 
unconnected constituents, which in turn provides opportunities to play members against each other (Burt, 
1992; Volker and Flap, 2001). I propose that corrupt information will undermine motivations to create 
linkages among alters, attenuating group cohesion. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3a: Corrupt information networks will have less cohesion than non-corrupt projects. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Sharing corrupt information will reduce transitive relationships for the individual. 
 
RESEARCH SETTING 
As mentioned earlier, this study is based on emails exchanged at Enron Corporation. Enron was 
an energy company based out of Houston, Texas and was one of the world’s leaders in electricity, natural 
gas, and communication. After many years of dramatic success, record-making profits, public acclaim, 
and favored status on Wall Street, Enron was brought under investigation. On October 22, 2001, the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that it was exploring several suspicious deals at The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   9       
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Enron. Shortly thereafter, Enron filed for bankruptcy – making it the largest bankruptcy of its time. It was 
later revealed that Enron hid massive amounts of debt using what were termed “creative accounting 
practices”  and  “off-balance-sheet”  transactions  through p r o j e c t s  w i t h  s p e c i a l  p u r p o s e  e n t i t i e s  ( S P E s ) .  
These activities not only precipitated the investigation of Enron’s accounting and management practices 
by the SEC, but also led to the enactment of federal laws to mitigate fraud, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002.  
While under investigation by the SEC, the Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
also brought charges against Enron for market manipulations. As part of the investigation, FERC seized 
Enron’s email servers, which contained five years of email correspondence. The data were later made 
available as the Enron Email Corpus (EEC). The EEC data is used here for a retrospective analysis of the 
firm and its internal projects via communication networks. Constructing networks from this large body of 
email text required selecting projects prior to examining the networks. Multiple sources, such as corporate 
documents,  government  reports,  and  media  coverage,  and  testimonies  and  autobiographies  from 
employees were used to select an appropriate set of projects for systematic comparison. Six projects were 
finally selected for analysis here.  
All of the six projects were conducted at the organizational level and required information sharing 
across functional groups. I limited this study to new and novel projects within the time frame that the data 
were collected so as not to miss prior communication shared in the group. Novel projects also provide an 
opportunity to understand the emergent social networks, because by their nature, these projects are not 
already integrated into the existing practices of the organization (Rogers, 1962). Organizational members 
must develop new channels by which to share and access information about the inchoate projects.   
The  first  three p r o j e c t s  w e r e  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  organizational  crimes  that e n a b l e d  fraudulent 
misrepresentation of the organization’s accounts. Each project purposefully violated existing accounting 
principles and was intentionally misleading (McLean and Elkind, 2003). These projects enabled Enron to 
present itself more attractively to investors, but also led the firm to file “materially false and misleading” 
annual and quarterly reports (SEC filing complaint 17692). Projects were identified through testimonies The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   10       
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and reports provided to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) concerning charges brought against Enron 
and  its  employees.  For  example,  a  former  treasurer  admitted,  “he  and  others  at  Enron  deliberately 
structured [project one] in a way that appeared to comply with, but in fact violated, applicable accounting 
rules” (USDOJ Release, 2003). Similar statements provided evidence that members designed the projects 
with the intention of misleading investors. In testimonies to the DOJ, Enron’s Chief Financial Officer 
confessed that the projects [two and three] were created to protect Enron's balance sheet from decreases in 
the value of certain investments (USDOJ Release, 2003b; USDOJ Release, 2004). Finally, in a report to 
the SEC, these three projects were found to be in violation of accounting laws and to have misreported 
Enron’s financial statements (SEC Report, 2001).  
The  remaining  three  non-corrupt  projects  were  selected  based  on  their  comparability  to  the 
corrupt projects at the firm along specific dimensions. The first criterion was to identify non-corrupt 
projects.
3 These had to be both publicly documented in Enron’s press releases and annual reports and not 
indentified as corrupt in any government agency reports or individual testimonies against Enron by the 
DOJ, SEC, or FERC (Enron, 1998-2000). Also, because all of the corrupt projects were based on limited 
partnership agreements, only non-corrupt limited partnerships projects were selected as matches. Capital 
under management was used to select comparably sized non-corrupt projects. Due to the misreporting of 
capital under management for the corrupt projects this was particularly tricky to determine; however, 
since  the c o r r u p t  p r o j e c t s  w e r e  u s e d  a s  v e h i c l e s  t o  k e e p  upwards  of  100  million  off  Enron’s  debt 
accounting, only non-corrupt projects estimated to be worth 100 million or more were included. Lastly, 
non-corrupt projects were limited to those that had similar project durations to the corrupt projects, lasting 
from two to three years between 1998 and 2002. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"#This is not to suggest that corruption is an absolute dichotomous state and that the non-corrupt projects 
were without corruption or that the corrupt projects were without legitimate activity. Instead, I suggest 
that corruption is a continuum. Here, I can only speak to the available evidence as gathered by 
government agencies and reported in news outlets and biographies. Based on this data, the projects have 
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Data Sources 
The organizational communication network was comprised of EEC emails sent between the years 
1998 to 2002. The EEC dataset consists of professional and personal email messages and contains both 
incoming  and  outgoing  emails.  Each  email  includes  the  following  information:  sender;  recipients; 
recipient form: to, carbon copy (CC), and blind carbon copy (BCC); transmission form: original, reply, 
and forward; date; folder title; subject; and message content. Within the EEC, there are over twenty-seven 
thousand unique senders and recipients, after the data were normalized to remove redundant emails (one 
individual  can  have  several  email  accounts  throughout  their  tenure  at  Enron),  group  emails,  and 
distribution lists.
4 
5  
Email exchange provides an ideal setting to understand individual communication behavior and 
social  networks  within  an  enterprise.  Notably,  Bernard,  Killworth,  and  Sailer  (1976;  1979)  find  that 
behavioral measures, such as those captured in electronic communication, are less sensitive to biases 
found in self-reported data, where individuals tend to over-report interactions with high-status actors or 
under-report  misdeeds.  Evidence  also  indicates  that  email  exchanges  closely  parallel  work  networks 
(Hinds  and  Kiesler,  1995;  Kleinbaum,  Stuart,  and  Tushman,  forthcoming).  Most  important  for  this 
analysis,  behavioral  measures  allow  observation  of  corruption  that  individuals  would  normally  be 
reluctant to report. 
The email messages were first qualitatively coded based on information pertinent to the project. 
The primary objective was to identify a complete set of emails containing information regarding each 
particular project. In the initial step, coding was done with the assistance of software, using key-word 
searches for all messages in the EEC. Key-word search term lists were based on the information from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The data was extracted from a subset of Enron accounts since the complete set was not available. The 
unique emails do not therefore represent the total number of accounts.  
5 Email addresses have been normalized to represent actual Enron employees in a variety of ways. First 
list-serve or group email accounts were removed, such as “wholesaleteam@enron.com.” In addition, 
emails accounts were combined when they belonged to a single individual. For example, Kenneth Lay 
had both “ken.lay@enron” and  “kenneth.lay@enron.”#The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   12       
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EEC  itself  and  complemented  with  additional  sources,  such  as  annual  reports,  individual  interviews, 
public statements, and testimonies from the SEC and the DOJ. The resulting subset was then reviewed 
and validated using traditional methods. These steps were iterated multiple times to refine the key-word 
search terms.
6 Through this process, the six different communication networks were derived based on the 
content of the information exchanged. Next, a directed one-mode network was created based on the email 
exchanges. The directed networks were constructed from the email headers, which identify the messages’ 
senders and recipients. Directed networks are critical to this analysis in order to determine the symmetry 
of information flow between organizational members.  
For each project and year, I extracted the individual’s egocentric network 2-degrees from ego 
(ego’s  friends’  friends).  Egocentric  networks  are  commonly  used  to  understand  individual  behavior 
within networks (Marsden, 1990), as the set of relations defined by an individual and her contacts with 
others. I limited the egocentric network to only 2-degrees for the following reason; individual egos can 
know and, to some degree, shape what their alters and their alters’ alters know. After 2-degrees, it would 
be difficult for ego to alter the amount of information that others may receive or influence their behavior. 
Further, beyond 2-degrees is considered outside of ego’s “sphere of influence” (Levine, 1972; Marsden, 
2002). For each project that an individual was involved in, an egocentric network was derived, which 
permits  the a n n u a l   observation o f  d i f f e r e n t  b e h a v i o r s  a c r o s s  t h e  p r o j e c t s.  Figure  1 i s  a  s t y l i z e d  
representation of the method for disaggregating network relations by content for both the network and 
individual members. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure.1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 In most cases, this entailed excluding certain emails that were not relevant. For example, one project 
shared a similar name with a Houston basketball team, which many Enron employees were fans. These 
messages were excluded from the analysis. The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   13       
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Measures 
This analysis examines three outcomes: communication frequency, reciprocity, and cohesion. Although 
the  measures  for  frequency  and  reciprocity  are  appropriate  for  sociocentric  and  egocentric  levels  of 
analysis, connectedness is not a suitable measure for egocentric networks (Marsden, 2002). Therefore, I 
use a different measure, transitivity, to examine cohesion in egocentric networks.  
Communication Frequency Frequency of communication is a common measure of relation strength and 
information bandwidth (Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Uzzi, 1999). At the group level, frequency is the 
average message per observed tie for the project duration. Frequency for individuals is the mean number 
of  messages shared with all of ego’s relations within a  year  for  the  project.  I  use  frequency  to  test 
Hypothesis 1a and 1b.  
Structural Asymmetry
7 Structural asymmetry captures the degree of asymmetry or non-reciprocity within 
the network. A completely asymmetrical network is one in which communication flows in one direction 
and is not reciprocated by the receivers. By counting the number of pairs that have reciprocated ties 
relative to the number of observed pairs of ties, I am able to assess the degree to which a structure 
deviates from complete asymmetry (Krackhardt, 1994). This index is used to measure both the project 
structure and individual behavior in the ego networks for testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b. An asymmetry 
index equal to 1 means that none of the pairs share a reciprocated tie; an index equal to 0 means that all 
ties are reciprocated. Provided below is the formula for asymmetry: 
 
 
 
Where V is the number of symmetrical pairs and max (V) is the total number of pairs.
8  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 This measure is termed hierarchy by Krackhardt (1994); however, I have renamed the index to parallel 
egocentric terminology used here.#
8 Dyadic reciprocity is treated as a dichotomous outcome here rather than a proportion of the 
asymmetrical communications.#The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   14       
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Sociocentric Cohesion Cohesion may be measured in a variety of ways, such as by examining graph 
density or the clustering coefficients; however, these measures are very sensitive to variations in network 
size, whereas measures like connectedness and transitivity are less sensitive to such variations (Friedkin, 
1981). Krackhardt’s (1994) connectedness measure captures the underlying proportion of the network that 
is a single component and is used to test Hypothesis 3a. Specifically, connectedness reflects the degree to 
which relations exist between all members of the network (Krackhardt, 1994). A component is a sub-
group  that  is  completely  connected,  meaning  all  individuals  share  at  least  one  tie  to  the  group.  A 
connectedness score of 1 indicates that all actors share at least one tie to the social structure. Conversely, 
a connectedness score of 0 means that all members are isolated from one another and do not share ties.
9 
When a social network is comprised of multiple components (un-connected sub-groups), the proportion 
of unreachable actors can be high and the connectedness index will be low. Below is Krackhardt’s (1994) 
formula for connectedness:  
 
 
 
Where V is the number of pairs that are not mutually reachable, and N(N-1)/2 is the total number of pairs. 
Connectedness scores do not account for the direction of ties. 
Egocentric Cohesion Transitivity is the ratio of closed triads that are connected to the individual. In other 
words, this is the ratio of ego’s alters that share a tie between themselves to those alters that do not. 
Transitivity  for  each  individual  was  calculated  on  the  undirected  graph.  Transitivity  is  used  to  test 
Hypothesis 3b. 
Independent  Variables  Corruption  information  is t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  Corrupt 
information is a dummy variable set equal to one if the project was found to be an organizational crime 
and is time-invariant. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The nature of email exchange makes this outcome impossible; however, disconnected sub-groups are 
likely. #The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   15       
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Controls Network size is a common and basic measure in social network research that reflects the number 
of  members  within  a  communication  structure  and  is  used  here  as  a  control  in  the  all  the  models 
(Marsden, 1990). In addition to predicting frequency, I also control for frequency in the models predicting 
structural asymmetry and social cohesion because it can affect dyadic and triadic relations (Wasserman 
and  Faust,  1994).  The  year  in  project  was  included  to  control  for  variations  in  project  tenure  for 
individuals.  The individual’s gender was included as a control since research suggests that it affects 
information networks in firms (Ibarra, 1997).
10  
Analysis of Project Structures 
Statistically comparing sociocentric measures such as connectedness and asymmetry can prove 
difficult  given  network  variation  in  size  and  density.
11 F o r  e x a m p l e ,  a l l  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k s  h e r e  h a v e  
different numbers of participants and ties, which makes direct comparison of network statistics difficult 
(see Table 1). The application of a classic method of data normalization, z-score transformation, provides 
a  way  of  standardizing  data  across  a  range  of  networks  and  allows  for  comparison  of  network  data 
independent of the original network size and density (Robins and Alexander, 2004). Population means 
and standard deviations for each network are based on 100 simulations conditioned on the network’s size 
and  degree  distribution.  The  z-scores  were  calculated  by  taking  the  observed  graph  indices,  such  as 
connectedness, minus the mean of all of the random networks divided by the standard deviation.  
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
In Table 1, I present the summary statistics and the sociocentric measures for the corrupt and non-
corrupt networks. Both sets of projects lasted between two to three years. The number of participants 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Appendix A for how gender was derived for individuals in the models.#
11#Network density is the proportion of observed ties over the total number of possible ties (Wasserman 
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varied between the two groups, with the non-corrupt projects being larger in size. In terms of the z-score 
comparisons,  it  is  important  to  note  that  in  Table  1  both  sets  of  observed  network  types  differ 
substantially on each dimension from the conditional random graph distributions, as well as from each 
other. This indicates there are underlying social processes operating for the two types of projects and the 
network forms are not by-products of a random processes. For each relation within a project, I calculated 
the tie frequency and performed a one-tailed t-test, with corrupt information as the grouping variable. The 
mean frequency was 2.830 for corrupt information and significantly higher for non-corrupt information, 
7.955 (t = 5.868; df = 12,409, p<.000). Thus, the communication between individuals was much higher 
within the non-corrupt networks, indicating a greater amount of information sharing among members. 
Next,  although  the  non-corrupt  networks  were n o t  m o r e  c o n n e c t e d  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a n  t h e i r  s i m u l a t e d  
counterparts  (z-score  =  -20.6273),  the  corrupt  networks  were  less  connected  than  the  non-corrupt 
networks  (z-score  =  -37.0402).  This  is  despite  the  fact  that t h e  n o n -corrupt  networks  had  far  more 
members. Lastly, non-corrupt networks also appear to be dramatically more reciprocal than the corrupt 
networks.  The  z-score  for  asymmetry  in  the  non-corrupt  networks  was e x t r e m e l y  l o w  ( z -score  =  -
275.423),  as  compared  to  the  asymmetry  in  corrupt  networks  (z-score  =  -49.261).  In  other  words, 
individuals  involved  in  corrupt  communication  networks  are  far  less  likely  to  reciprocate 
communications. This analysis provides evidence in support for all the hypotheses regarding network 
structures differences (i.e., 1a, 2a, and 3a).  
Given these findings, I suggest that organizational crime networks reflect a structure similar to a 
wheel’s hub-and-spokes, a central clique surrounded by satellite nodes. The network graphs of all six 
projects are shown in Figure 2. In the network graphs, all the communications are represented for the 
duration of the project and node sizes denote the individual’s in-degree standardized for the project.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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The above network graphs make apparent that a small clique of members serves as the hub at the 
center of the corrupt network where the periphery members channel information. Surrounding the hub are 
spokes, individuals who do not share ties with each other. The spokes provide the hub with access to 
information and resources throughout the network. Thus, the spokes permit the hub to span structural 
holes. Maintaining a network full of structural holes not only maximizes access to information, but also 
allows  central  members  to  take  advantage  of  those  in  the  periphery  who  are  less  informed  (Brass, 
Butterfield,  and  Skaggs  1998;  Burt  2004;  Mitchell  2003). Keeping  the  spokes  isolated  also  helps to 
mitigate t h e  r i s k s  o f  either  coalitions  or  whistle-blowers.
12  This  structure m a x i m i z e s  power a n d  
information control for those residing in the core. Interestingly, individuals in the core were more likely to 
be found guilty in the trials regarding Enron’s fraud  (see Appendix B for trial evidence). 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
In Figure 3 the density plots for in-degree distributions are given by project type. Peaks and 
valleys characterize the density plots for the corrupt networks, as opposed to the non-corrupt network 
plots, in which the distribution is gradual and smooth, indicating that the in-degree communication for 
non-corrupt pursuits was much more evenly distributed. The graph also suggests that the corrupt networks 
were  partitioned  by  relational  access.  Classes  of  members  received  varying  amounts  of  incoming 
communication ties in the organizational crime networks. Thus, the corrupt networks appear to have 
“compartmental insulation,” which limits exposure of the whole group, as Goffman (1970) suggested 
(p78). This graduation of information access acts to separate members and may shield the leaders of the 
system (Simmel 1950; p356). Extending the hub-and-spoke metaphor, this would imply that there were 
concentric circles of involvement within the system.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!$#Given this particular structure and the aggregation of information at the hub, one might speculate that 
the spokes were unaware of the full extent of the crime despite having access to enough of the project 
details to implicate the group.#The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   18       
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Analysis of Individual Behavior 
For  study  2,  observations  were b a s e d  o n  i n d i v i d u a l  b e h a v i o r  w i t h i n  all  of  the s i x   project 
networks. The data are a panel of observations for each group member based on project-year. The time-
varying variables were measured annually within project. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and a 
correlation  matrix  of  all  1,571  project  members  with  5,009  project-year  observations.  To  examine 
communication behavior across the corrupt and non-corrupt projects, I used a random effects estimator 
with two-way fixed effects. I estimate the models with the White/Huber robust estimator, which yields 
consistent standard errors even when the residuals across individuals are not identically distributed. The 
three dependent variables – frequency, asymmetry, and transitivity – are presented across the six models 
in a step-wise fashion in Table 3. Models 1, 3, and 5 are the control models for the three dependent 
variables examined. The parameter of fundamental interest amongst all the models is corrupt information. 
In  Model  2,  corruption s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e d u c e d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  along  communication  ties  (-3.793;  p  < 
0.000) as hypothesized by 1b. Thus, for each relation in a corrupt network, individuals sent almost 4 
fewer messages. From Model 4, we see that corruption also increased asymmetry in relations (0.084; p < 
0.000). In other words, a sender of corrupt information was significantly less likely to receive a reciprocal 
message. Model 6 provides evidence that transitivity was also lower in criminal communications (-0.091; 
p < 0.000). Therefore, I find support for both Hypotheses 2b and 3b. Although the size of the individual’s 
network is significant for the all the models, the effect size is small as compared to that of corrupt 
information. Communication frequency was included as a control variable in Models 3 through 6 and has 
the reverse effect on the dependent variables than that of corrupt information. It is not surprising that 
more interactions would both increase reciprocity and transitivity in relations, but the effects size is much 
smaller than that of corruption. In the complete models, year in project also has the opposite effect than 
corruption on asymmetry and transitivity but not frequency. This finding indicates that longer project 
tenure reduced the need for frequent email exchanges, yet led to greater reciprocity and cohesion. In 
models not shown, gender was included and was not significant in any of the models. Taken together, 
these results indicate that corruption is a strong determinant of the communication behaviors observed. The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   19       
  19!
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
In order to examine the effects of corruption more closely, a subsequent analysis of members who 
participated in both corrupt and non-corrupt networks was conducted. Analyzing the individuals that 
participated in both types of networks mitigates the possibility of sample selection bias since the same 
individual  can  be  compared  across  the  two  types  of  projects.  From  the  original  sample  of  1,571 
individuals involved in the six projects, 114 were identified who participated in both non-corrupt and 
corrupt  projects.  I  use  this  sample  to  observe  the  behavior  of  individuals  across  different  types  of 
information  networks.  In o r d e r  t o  hold  constant  individual  level  differences a n d  c o r r e c t  f o r  n o n -
independence common to network samples, I employ two-way fixed-effects estimates by project-year for 
the analyses.
13 The results should be interpreted as explaining within-individual variations.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
In Table 4, I present the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of the 114 individuals with 
838 project-year observations. In Table 5, the fixed-effects regression models are presented with only the 
control variables included in the first, third, and fifth models.
14 Hypothesis 1b predicted that individuals 
would have less frequent communication when sharing corrupt information. Model 2 shows that the effect 
of corrupt information is significant for the frequency of individual level communication (-3.621; p < 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 A Hausman test confirmed that fixed-effects specification was more appropriate than random-effects. 
14 Although year in project was used as a control variable in the random-intercept models, it is not 
included in the fixed-effect models because project-year observations are within subject. The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   20       
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0.000).  Therefore,  corruption  reduces  how  frequently  an  individual  shares  information b y  r o u g h l y  4 
emails. Hypothesis 2b predicted that corrupt information would reduce reciprocity for an individual’s 
egocentric networks. The estimates from Model 4 support this; corrupt information increases asymmetry 
for  an  individual’s  networks  (0.100;  p  =  0.001),  indicating t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  
reciprocal exchanges in fraudulent communication networks. Hypothesis 3b predicted reduced transitivity 
when individuals shared corrupt information. The results in Model 6 indicate that when individuals share 
corrupt information, triadic closure is less likely (-0.095; p < 0.000). Corrupt information appears to alter 
behavior for the individual, causing them to have less frequent and less reciprocal communications, which 
are also less likely to be embedded in a triad. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that the information type 
alters individual behavior, which mirror the aggregate network structures observed in study 1.  
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
This  analysis  finds  evidence  for e n d o g e n o u s  m e c h a n i s m s  t h a t  l e a d  t o  d i v e r g e n t  n e t w o r k  
characteristics  when  communication  is  parsed  by  corrupt  content.  In  the  first  study,  the  topological 
implications of organizational crime on networks indicate that the structures will be sparse, comprised 
primarily of asymmetrical connections with infrequent communications. The data strongly suggests that 
the structure of organizational crimes tends toward a hub-and-spoke shape with members partitioned into 
concentric circles. Study 1’s findings add greater empirical detail to early theories and case studies of 
secret and illegal societies, such as the mafia’s powerful cupola or the strategic core of terrorist groups 
(Cruickshank and Ali, 2007; Gambetta, 1993). The results also support the role of content specification in 
social network research, and disaggregating networks by information, such as corruption, may present 
new opportunities to better understand network forms and their emergent forms. 
The second study departs from conventional social network analysis to consider the message 
contents effect on individuals. By providing evidence that members channel non-corrupt and corrupt 
information  differently,  the  data  indicate t h a t  social  interactions  hinge,  in  part, o n   information t y p e . 
Information i s  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  c o n c e p t  f o r  s t u d y i n g  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  i n d i v i d u a l s .  I n d i v i d u a l s  
communicate to create, share, alter, and validate information and these processes help individuals to reach The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   21       
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a mutual understanding (March and Simon, 1958; Monge and Contractor, 2003). Since social relations are 
largely based on communication, understanding information is critical to conceptualizing social networks. 
As evidenced here, individuals choose what information to share and with whom to share it, thus altering 
their interactions and associations. Subsequently, these decisions have consequences for  not only the 
individual but also the entire social structure.  
By comparing individuals’ communication patterns and their surrounding social structure, this 
study addresses the call for more theories of agency in social network research (Ibarra, Kilduff, and Tsai, 
2005; Sasovova et al., 2010). Information content may provide a key to understanding the micro-macro 
link.  Evidence  provided  here d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  m i c r o -communication  strategies  of  organizational 
members lead to different relational patterns, which, in turn, have cumulative effects on the emergent 
social structure.  
By developing my account of corrupt projects, I hope to also shed light on the dark side of 
networks. Clandestine structures are challenging to understand due to the scarcity of reliable data, given 
their secretive nature (Carley, 2006). Understanding underlying structures that facilitate corruption can 
have meaningful implications for both organizations and policy-makers (Brass, Butterfield, and Skaggs, 
1998). For organizational research, these results demonstrate that information shapes networks to take 
different topological forms and these resulting communication structures can have consequences for the 
organization’s information-processing ability (Argote and Ophir, 2002; Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951). In 
addition to the implications of having members involved in fraud or corruption, corruption can lead to 
behaviors that hinder information flow throughout the firm and the fractioning of the communication 
network. These cleavages can severely handicap the organization‘s ability to operate or respond to a crisis 
(Krackhardt and Stern, 1988).  
Particularly  since  corrupt  information  may  not  be  common w i t h i n  m o s t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s , f u t u r e  
research need not be limited to the corrupt and non-corrupt typology. A meaningful extension would be to 
examine overt and covert content. For instance, organizations may have covert projects that prize secrecy The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   22       
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but are not corrupt, such as a confidential research and development team with strict a non-disclosure 
agreement. Such networks might mirror the interpersonal mechanisms found in corrupt project relations. 
Studying such cases would help to clarify the differences between the motivations of interactions when 
the information is fraudulent versus simply secretive.  
  A  potential  shortcoming  of  this  analysis  is  the  possibility  that  corrupt  communications  were 
conducted through outside email accounts or other mediums, such as phone calls or meetings. I was very 
sensitive to these concerns in the qualitative analysis of the emails. The qualitative analysis suggests that 
corrupt members shared similar amounts of information via email as non-corrupt members. Although the 
overall email volume was different between corrupt and non-corrupt projects, the word count per email 
was not significantly different. Further, the criminal emails did not have greater occurrences of phrases 
that would indicate alternative channels of communication, such as “meet privately” or “discuss over the 
phone.”  In  addition,  personal  email  accounts  were  included  if  they  contained  pertinent  project 
information, in case members tried to use non-work email systems. Finally, Enron’s case was the first to 
include electronic documents in the trial, so individuals may not have considered email as a “paper trail.” 
Still it is not possible to irrefutably conclude that email captured all the fraudulent conversations. Future 
research might explore the uses of communication mediums for corrupt ends.   
Despite  significant  advantages,  the  data  used  here  impose  some  limitations  on  the  study  of 
content and social networks. The first and most important limitation relates to message censoring. Only 
messages that were available on the servers were used in the analysis. This poses two issues: I do not 
know the total volume of emails and certain messages may have been intentionally deleted, causing a bias 
in the sample. However, since the sender and all recipients would have to delete the email for the message 
to be lost completely, this appears to be an unusual occurrence. A second limitation is the question of the 
study’s generalizability to other networks and organizations. Notwithstanding this limitation, a focus on 
one firm has benefits. Comparing projects within the same organization minimizes variation of other 
organizational variables, such as culture or norms of communication. However, we cannot completely 
rule out the moderating effects of Enron’s formal structure and its culture.   APPENDIX A – Determining Gender for Enron Employees 
Although individual’s genders were not available in the original Enron dataset, it was inferred 
through a matching process of the members’ first names. The gender of employees was obtained by 
parsing first names from emails that followed the format of “FIRSTNAME.LASTNAME@enron.com” 
and then comparing names to the U. S. social security name database. This public dataset provides the 
most  common f i r s t  n a m e s  b y  y e a r  a n d  g e n d e r .  Emails  with  ambiguous  first  names  or i n i t i a l s  w e r e  
disregarded.  This  matching  technique  allowed  for  the  gender  identification  of  1,145  of  the  1,571 
employees  who  participated  in  both  corrupt  and  non-corrupt  projects.  Approximately,  35%  of  the 
matched sample was identified as female and reflects Enron’s gender composition at the management 
level. 
 
 APPENDIX B – Replication and Extension of Baker and Faulkner’s (1993) Model for Enron  
In Baker and Faulkner (1993) original analysis, they examined an individual’s likelihood of being 
sentenced  based  on b o t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  n e t w o r k  a n d  t hree  centrality  measures f o r  
individual’s position in the network include – degree, betweenness, and closeness.
15 However, they did 
not include individual in-degree nor did they include eigenvector centrality as a determinant of criminal 
sentence. Degree is aggregate measure of both in-degree and out-degree. By examining in-degree, we can 
disentangle  those  who  may  have  sent  many  messages  from  those  who  received  many  messages. 
Eigenvector  centrality  captures  the  cumulative  effect  of  degree  on  information. T h e s e  t w o  m e a s u r e s  
indicate individuals who had the greatest access to information and were the power hubs as indentified in 
study 1. I report the descriptives for the variables used in this analysis in table A.1. In Table A.2, I 
replicate Baker and Faulkner’s analysis with 352 members from the corrupt networks.
16 The dependent 
measure is a guilty plea or sentence based on all the Enron-related trials brought by the DOJ. Both in-
degree and eigenvector are significant in the model but eigenvector has a far greater effect size for a 
guilty conviction. This analysis offers evidence that the powerful actors were centralized in the hub of the 
network and were possibly orchestrating the crimes.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table A.1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table A.2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Degree centrality is simply the number of ties to an individual. Betweenness centrality indicates how 
many paths between others the individual occupied. Closeness centrality measures how proximate the 
individual is to others in the network. 
16 This model differs slightly in that it does not include the manager’s rank (top or middle), which was not 
available in this study. However, manager’s rank was not significant for the Baker and Faulkner models.#The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   25       
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Table 1.         
Network Descriptives by Content Type*          
  
Legitimate Projects  
(N=3) 
Corrupt Projects 
(N=3)  All Projects     
Duration (Years)  2.6667  2.6667  2.2857   
         
Network Size  676  118  340.2857   
         
Network Frequency  7.9552  2.8299  7.5183   
         
Observed Connectedness  0.8952  0.5460  0.6177   
         
Simulated Distribution for 
Connectedness  0.9969  0.9871     
  (-0.0033)  (-0.014)     
Connectedness (z-score)  -20.6273  -37.0402     
         
Observed Asymmetry  0.0088  0.0331  0.0180   
         
Simulated Distribution for Asymmetry  0.0170  0.0620     
  (-0.0001)  (-0.0013)     
Asymmetry (z-score)  -275.4225  -49.2616     
         
              
* Standard deviations in parentheses.         
 
 
 The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   32 
 
 
Table 2.                       
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable                                   
    mean  sd  min  max  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
Time in Project    2.290  0.900  1.000  4.000             
Network Size    378.280  364.080  3.000  1,154.000  0.021           
Corruption    0.160  0.370  0.000  1.000  0.252  -0.422         
Frequency    7.920  4.550  1.000  38.350  -0.304  0.473  -0.493       
Asymmetry    0.070  0.100  0.000  0.830  0.063  -0.544  0.465  -0.410    -0.405 
Transitivity    0.150  0.100  0.000  0.750  -0.102  -0.170  -0.190  0.118  0.347  0.37 
                       
                                   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.       
Random Intercept Effects of Corruption on Individual Communication*    
    Content-Specific Frequency  Content-Specific Asymmetry  Content-Specific Transitivity    
Variable     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    
                 
Corrupt Information      -3.793***    0.084***    -0.091***   
      (0.208)    (0.015)    (0.017)   
Network Size    0.005***  0.003***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***   
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Frequency        -0.004***  -0.003***  0.004***  0.002***   
        (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)   
Year in Project    -1.422***  -1.121***  -0.000***  -0.004***  -0.000***  0.004***   
    (0.0507)  (0.0457)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   
Intercept    9.503***  9.993***  0.142***  0.113***  0.135***  0.167***   
    (0.208)  (0.218)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.009)   
Project-Year Fixed Effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Individual Random Effects                 
Constant    2.373  2.258  0.054  0.054  0.077  0.054   
    (.068)  (.065)  (.001)  (.001)  (.002)  (.001)   
Residual    2.944  2.829  0.058  0.055  0.062  0.055   
    (.035)  (.034)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)   
                 
N(Total Project-Year)     5,009  5,009  5,009  5,009  5,009  5,009   
Total Number of Individuals    1,571  1,571  1,571  1,571  1,571  1,571   
                 
R-Square (between)    0.323  0.378  0.3255  0.366  0.078  0.121   
R-Square (overall)    0.376  0.436  0.3698  0.379  0.146  0.148   
                 
        
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.       
* Robust Standard errors in parentheses. All models include unreported project-year effects.       The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   34       
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Table 4.                         
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable                                      
    mean  sd  min  max  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)       
Network Size    241.290  348.510  3.000  1,151.000               
Corruption    0.490  0.500  0.000  1.000  -0.606             
Frequency    5.500  4.210  1.000  38.350  0.648  -0.626           
Asymmetry    0.110  0.140  0.000  0.830  -0.444  0.459  -0.411         
Transitivity    0.120  0.120  0.000  0.750  0.017  -0.260  0.164  0.413       
                         
                                     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   35 
 
 
Table 5.       
Fixed Effects of Corruption on Individual Communication     
   
Content-Specific 
Frequency 
Content-Specific 
Asymmetry 
Content-Specific 
Transitivity    
Variable     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    
                 
Corrupt Information      -3.621***    0.100***    -0.095***   
      (0.452)    (0.029)    (0.034)   
Network Size    0.008***  0.005***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***   
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Frequency        -0.007***  -0.002  0.007***  0.002   
        (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)   
Intercept    3.535***  6.170***  0.177***  0.088***  0.0947***  0.180***   
    (0.0571)  (0.345)  (0.009)  (0.026)  (0.006)  (0.030)   
Project-Year Fixed Effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
                 
N(Total Project-Year)     838  838  838  838  838  838   
Total Number of Individuals    114  114  114  114  114  114   
                 
R-Square (within)    0.450  0.595  0.339  0.385  0.050  0.192   
                 
!  !  ! 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.       
* Robust Standard errors in parentheses. All models include unreported project-year effects. 
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Table A1.   
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations    
Variable                                  
    mean  sd  min  max  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
Trial Conviction    0.050  0.210  0.000  1.000             
Degree    2.340  4.120  1.000  55.000  -0.008           
In-Degree±    0.780  0.750  0.000  5.000  0.111  0.608         
Closeness !    -4.910  2.030  -6.910  0.000  0.006  0.009  0.012       
Betweenness±    0.060  0.070  0.000  0.330  0.068  0.395  0.243  -0.301     
Eigenvector±    6.570  16.290  0.000  96.310  0.010  0.595  0.477  -0.237  0.276   
                       
                                   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                         
! Logged variable.                 
±  Square Root variable.                   
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Table A2. 
Logistic Regression on Trial Convictions for Corrupt Network Participants (N=354) 
    B & F Model  Enron Model     ! ! !
Variable     (1)  (2)     ! ! !
          ! ! !
Degree    -0.0289  -0.387*    ! ! !
    (0.0935)  (0.208)    ! ! !
In-Degree±      1.896***    ! ! !
      (0.721)    ! ! !
Closeness Centrality!    -0.0312  0.232    ! ! !
    (0.173)  (0.220)    ! ! !
Eigenvector Centrality±      14.00**    ! ! !
      (7.066)    ! ! !
Betweenness Centrality±    0.0101  -0.00870    ! ! !
    (0.0206)  (0.0256)    ! ! !
Project Controls    Yes  Yes    ! ! !
          ! ! !
Intercept    -2.852***  -3.875***    ! ! !
    (0.750)  (0.993)    ! ! !
          ! ! !
R-Squared     0.012  0.124    ! ! !
LR Chi2    1.590  16.150    ! ! !
          ! ! !
          ! ! !
   ! !
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.        ! !
* Standard errors in parentheses.      ! !
! Logged variable.          ! ! !
±  Square Root variable.          ! ! !
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Figure 1. Stylized depiction of network disaggregation by content. 
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Corrupt Project 3 
 
 
 
Non-Corrupt Project 1 
 
 
Non-Corrupt Project 2 
 
 
Non-Corrupt Project 3 
 
Figure 2. Corrupt and Non-corrupt Project Network Graphs 
(Vertices size is the individual’s in-degree standardized for the project; Fruchterman-Reingold Spring Algorithm: repulsion = 3 & 
iterations =10.) The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior   40 
 
 
Figure 3. In-degree Distributions by Corrupt and Non-corrupt Project Type. 
 